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CAN RIGHTS, DEMOCRACY, AND JUSTICE BE 
RECONCILED THROUGH DISCOURSE 
THEORY? REFLECTIONS ON 
HABERMAS'S PROCEDURALIST 
PARADIGM OF LAW 
Michel Rosenfeld* 
INTRODUCTION 
There are different images or paradigms of law which corre­
spond to different conceptions of justice and different sources of 
legitimacy. Moreover, in the context of complex, pluralistic con­
temporary societies, the relationship between law, justice, and le­
gitimacy has become acutely problematic as competing conceptions 
of the good cast legal relationships as relationships among stran­
gers,^ and as justice according to law^ seems irretrievably split from 
justice against or beyond law.^ In the face of these difficulties, one 
could simply abandon the quest for justice beyond law and settle 
for a combination of democracy and legal positivism which would 
reduce political legitimacy to majority rule and confine the role of 
law to the stabilization of expectations among legal subjects. How­
ever, if fearful of tyrannical majorities and dissatisfied with the 
prospect of predictable but unjust laws, one could opt for justice 
beyond law and embrace human rights as a shield against the 
abuses of legislative majorities and the inequities of positive law. 
In short, in a contemporary pluralist society, law's legitimacy seems 
to require sacrificing either democracy or justice."* 
* Professor of Law, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law. 
1 Cf. MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 637 (Guenther Roth & Claus Wittich 
eds., 1968) (greater differentiation characteristic of modern legal systems was prompted by 
the advent of the market which brought strangers together to exchange goods and which 
had to be regulated by universal laws transcending the biases of intracommunal norms). 
2 "Justice according to law is achieved when each person is treated in conformity with 
his or her legal entitlement." Michel Rosenfeld, Autopoiesis and Justice, 13 CARDOZO L. 
REV. 1681, 1681 (1992) (footnote omitted). 
3 "Justice against law, on the other hand, is the justice that makes it plausible to claim 
that a law is unjust (even if it is scrupulously applied in strict compliance with the entitle­
ments which the law establishes)." Id. 
Recent debates in American constitutional law offer a salient example of the split 
between democracy and justice. Some have advocated restrictive interpretations of consti­
tutional rights, for fear of unduly trampling on the will of legislative majorities, while 
others have not hesitated to promote enlarging the scope of antimajoritarian constitutional 
rights in the name of "fundamental justice" and "basic fairness." Compare, e.g., the ma-
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Being relegated to either democracy or justice is bound to be 
frustrating, in as much as majoritarian rule cannot be purged of all 
arbitrariness and justice cannot shed all intracommunal roots to 
rise above the reach of partial communities.^ There is, however, an 
apparent way out of the vicious circle circumscribed by arbitrary 
democracy and parochial justice. That way out is through 
proceduralism, or, more precisely, through the kind of procedural-
ism that is capable of yielding what John Rawls calls "pure proce­
dural justice."® It bears emphasizing that most kinds of 
proceduralism will not do. After all, democratic lawmaking can be 
viewed as a form of proceduralism based on universal suffrage and 
majority rule. Nonetheless, it is conceivable that there could be 
some kind of proceduralism capable of overcoming the residual ar­
bitrariness of democratic lawmaking while, at the same time, main­
taining a neutral stance toward the diverse and often conflicting 
conceptions of the good found throughout the polity. 
Habermas's proceduralist paradigm of law has all the makings 
of a most attractive candidate for the purpose of establishing the 
legitimacy of law through pure procedural justice. Indeed, 
Habermas's proceduralist approach based on communicative ac­
tion deals with the residual arbitrariness of democracy by relying 
on dialogical consensus as the source of law's legitimacy. On the 
other hand, Habermas's proceduralism provides fundamental 
rights a legal grounding that seemingly obviates any need to justify 
such rights in terms of any conception of the good not equally 
shared by all the members of the polity. Moreover, not only does 
Habermas's proceduralist approach to law offer a way to resolve 
the conflict between democracy and justice, it also aims at estab-
jority, concurring, and dissenting opinions in cases such as Planned Parenthood of South­
eastern Pa. V. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); and 
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
5 Justice beyond law cannot achieve complete impartiality toward all strangers in the 
relevant class of legal subjects. Therefore, it must, at least in part, rely on a vision of the 
good that has intracommunal roots, thereby favoring members of the relevant intracom­
munal group over the remaining legal subjects. Thus, even the most basic and fundamental 
human rights embodied in numerous international covenants have been criticized as being 
somewhat parochial or culturally biased. See generally Bums H. Weston, Human Rights, in 
HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE WORLD COMMUNITY: ISSUES AND ACTION (Richard P. Claude & 
Bums H. Weston eds., 1989) (focusing on westem liberal origins of modem human rights 
conceptions); see also WILL KYMLICKA, MULTICULTURAL CITIZENSHIP 4 (1995) ("Tradi­
tional human right standards are simply unable to resolve some of the most important and 
controversial questions relating to cultural minorities."). 
6 According to Rawls, pure procedural justice is achieved when any outcome is justly 
provided because a fair procedure was properly followed. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF 
JUSTICE 86 (1971). 
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lishing an internal connection between popular sovereignty and 
human rights, thus providing a normative underpinning for a legal 
regime that is poised to satisfy both democracy and justice. 
In the last analysis, the value of proceduralism and the possi­
bility of achieving pure procedural justice depend on the back­
ground assumptions and the material conditions surrounding the 
insertion and deployment of the relevant procedural devices and 
practices. Consistent with this, I will argue that Habermas's 
proceduralist paradigm of law ultimately fails to generate pure pro­
cedural justice and that it falls short of furnishing a comprehensive 
resolution of the conflict between democracy and justice. 
Habermas appears to have taken proceduralism as far as it can go, 
and through his discourse theory has made great progress over the 
proceduralism that has emerged from the works of his major pred­
ecessors, namely, Hobbes, Kant, and Rawls. But, as I shall en­
deavor to indicate in what follows, even Habermas's more nuanced 
and versatile proceduralism ultimately confronts the need to em­
brace contestable substantive normative assumptions in order to 
contribute to the resolution of conflicts that divide the members of 
the polity. 
In order to be in a better position to provide a principled as­
sessment of Habermas's proceduralism, I shall first attempt to put 
it in context. Accordingly, in Part I, I briefly examine some of the 
most salient general features of proceduralism as a means to estab­
lish its normative legitimacy. In Part II, I concentrate on the back­
ground assumptions, material conditions, and tasks which give 
shape to Habermas's proceduralism and I provide a critical assess­
ment of certain problems it raises. In Part III, I take a close look at 
a type of feminist objection which seems to go to the heart of 
Habermas's discourse-theoretical justification of law. Finally, in 
Part IV, I conclude that Habermas's discourse-theoretical ap­
proach to law, while incapable of generating pure procedural jus­
tice, nonetheless can play an important constructive role in 
determining the normative legitimacy of contemporary law. 
I. 
Procedural justice—of which pure procedural justice is a limit­
ing case—is a necessary component of any complex system for dis­
pensing justice. Procedural justice, moreover, has an essentially 
twofold role in a contemporary constitutional legal system: first, to 
insure the just application of substantive norms belonging to the 
realms of distributive, corrective, or retributive justice; and second. 
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to protect the worth and dignity of persons whose legal entitlement 
and obligations are subject to determination or modification by in­
strumentalities of the state. While these two roles of procedural 
justice are often intertwined in practice, they remain conceptually 
distinct. Thus, for example, in the context of the United States's 
adversarial criminal law system, the defendant's right to counsel 
and right to cross-examine witnesses can be viewed in two ways. 
These rights can be seen as both an important tool in the pursuit of 
the truth—which is essential to the fair application of the substan­
tive norms embodied in the relevant criminal statues—and as a 
means of recognizing the defendant's inherent dignity by guaran­
teeing his or her right of participation in a proceeding that may 
result in a drastic change in his or her legal status. Conceptually, 
however, procedural justice as a means of application is generally 
parasitic on the substantive norms which it is designed to imple­
ment. Accordingly, the adversary system's suitability as a vehicle 
of procedural justice depends on whether it provides a reliable 
means to ascertain the guilt or innocence of the accused. Providing 
such a means is essential to the implementation of the relevant sub­
stantive norms of justice embodied in the criminal code. In con­
trast, procedural justice as a means to vindicate the dignity of the 
accused is largely independent from, though it cannot squarely 
frustrate the application of, the above mentioned relevant substan­
tive norms. Consistent with this reasoning, even when the evi­
dence against a criminal defendant is so overwhelming that guilt is 
obvious beyond any reasonable doubt, the defendant is still enti­
tled to have "his day in court."'' 
Accordingly, procedural justice simultaneously depends on 
and transcends particular substantive norms of justice.® It does not 
follow from that, however, that by virtue of transcending a particu­
lar substantive norm, or a particular set of substantive norms, pro­
cedural justice transcends all substantive norms. In fact, even 
when procedural justice vindicates human dignity, it depends on 
7 Furthermore, to the extent that its ability to ferret out the truth is what makes the 
American adversary system of criminal justice procedurally just as a means of applying 
relevant substantive norms of retributive justice, some of its key features as a guarantor of 
human dignity—such as the Fifth Amendment's privilege against self-incrimination, which 
allows the criminal defendant not to testify against him or herself—seem somewhat at odds 
with its role as a procedural vehicle for the application of substantive justice. 
8 Actually, the dependence between procedural justice and substantive norms of dis­
tributive, corrective, or retributive justice is mutual rather than one sided. Indeed, if a 
substantive norm is not capable of being applied in a procedurally just manner, it is alto­
gether not suitable as a legitimate legal norm, although it may still qualify as a legitimate 
moral norm. 
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substantive norais. However, the norms on which procedural jus­
tice depends, in that instance, operate at a higher level of abstrac­
tion than the particular substantive norms sought to be applied in a 
just manner. Furthermore, because it is likely that there would be 
a greater consensus regarding the substantive norms operating at 
higher levels of abstraction (compared to the less abstract substan­
tive norms sought to be applied in a just manner), the more ab­
stract norms may appear to be universal or beyond conflicting 
conceptions of the good. In other words, from the perspective of 
the level of abstraction at which the conflict of particular substan­
tive norms unfolds, the more abstract norms may be perceived as 
remaining beyond dispute. 
To illustrate this last point, let us consider the following exam­
ple. Suppose that a state guarantees a certain minimum standard 
of living to every citizen; everyone who can prove that he or she 
cannot reach this standard through his or her own means is entitled 
to receive public assistance. To implement this policy, the state 
erects a welfare administration charged with the responsibilities of 
processing applications for public assistance, determining whether 
to award public assistance to particular applicants, and determining 
whether to terminate such assistance upon a finding that a particu­
lar recipient no longer needs it. Suppose, further, that the state's 
constitution requires that each citizen be given an opportunity to 
be heard before the revocation of any statutory entitlement.^ To 
assess the administrative procedures designed to carry out the 
state's public assistance program, reference must be made to the 
following two norms: each citizen has a right to a state-guaranteed 
minimum standard of living; and every citizen is entitled to be 
treated with dignity and respect—which in this case requires that 
he or she be afforded an opportunity to be heard before the termi­
nation of public assistance payments. Although both of these 
norms are substantive and contestable, the first, which is more con­
crete, is much more likely to generate controversy than the second. 
Thus, whereas libertarians, utilitarians, and egalitarians would un­
doubtedly all endorse the second norm, they would most certainly 
disagree concerning the legitimacy of the first norm, with the liber­
tarians strongly objecting against welfare rights.^" Also, from 
within the trenches of the conflict over welfare rights, the equal 
9 Cf. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment requires a hearing prior to the termination of welfare payments), 
TO See, e.g., ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA (1974). 
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dignity norm may be perceived as universally valid or at least set­
tled beyond dispute. 
The importance of procedural justice for modem legal systems 
and the importance of its structure enabling it to fulfill the twofold 
role identified above are no accident. Given modem law's strong 
tendency to cast relationships among legal subjects as relationships 
between strangers, it is hardly surprising that matters of procedure 
should be brought to the forefront often predominating over mat­
ters of substance." Perhaps less obvious, but equally important, is 
the fact that this flight to procedure can never be completely suc­
cessful, since matters of substance persist although they are often 
either concealed or displaced. A particularly important example of 
how substantive norms can be concealed by procedural ones 
emerges through a closer look at pure procedural justice. 
Rawls suggests gambling as an example of pure procedural 
justice. In his own words, "If a number of persons engage in a 
series of fair bets, the distribution of cash after the last bet is fair, 
or at least not unfair, whatever this distribution is."^^ In other 
words, any distribution resulting from a series of fair bets is just, so 
long as the bets remain fair. If there is no tampering with the bet­
ting procedure, such as there would be in the case of cheating, then 
the outcome of the betting is purely procedurally just (or purely 
procedurally not unjust). Moreover, since gambling is a means to 
distribute or redistribute money or goods, gambling which consists 
exclusively of a series of fair bets produces, in a purely procedural 
manner, outcomes which further, or at least do not contradict, the 
requirements of distributive justice. 
If we look more closely at the proposition "any distribution 
resulting from a series of fair bets is just," we can discern two dif­
ferent plausible interpretations: one narrowly focused on gambling 
as a procedure, the other more broadly focused on gambling as a 
distributive device. Under the narrow interpretation, fair gam­
bling, in contrast to unfair gambling, is just to the extent that all 
participants in fair gambling obtain everything which they are enti-
An extreme example of the uses of procedural issues to mask conflicts between par­
ties with widely divergent conceptions of the good is provided by the protracted discus­
sions concerning the shape of the negotiating table at the onset of certain peace talks. See, 
e.g., Thomas L. Friedman, Third Round of Mideast Talks Closes with Scant Progress, N.Y. 
TIMES, Jan. 17, 1992, at AL; Jackson Diehl & David Hoffman, Participants Gather for 
Mideast Peace Talks, WASH. POST, Oct. 29, 1991, at A16. 
12 RAWLS, supra note 6, at 86. 
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tied to expect, namely an equal opportunity^^ (in the sense of an 
equal probability) to become the winner. From the broader per­
spective, however, fair gambling can only be just—or, much more 
likely, not unjust—if certain material conditions and certain nor­
mative assumptions are present. Thus, if fair gambling only in­
volves individuals who risk small amounts of discretionary income, 
in the context of a normative setting where random allocations of 
discretionary income would not contravene prevailing norms of 
distributive justice, then any outcome of fair gambling is not unjust. 
If, on the other hand, fair gambling were to involve large sums of 
money, including what for some gamblers would be considered 
sums necessary for purposes of their subsistence, and if the gam­
bling were to take place in a setting in which, according to prevail­
ing substantive norms of distributive justice, redistributions of 
income that cause any one to fall below the subsistence level are 
deemed to be unjust, then even such fair gambling would clearly be 
(distributively) unjust. 
As the example of gambling indicates, pure procedural justice 
depends on substantive norms of justice as much as the other forms 
of procedural justice. Pure procedural justice differs only in that 
under the confluence of certain material conditions and certain 
substantive norms of justice, application of a given procedure is 
bound to produce a just (not unjust) outcome or one of many 
equally just (not unjust) outcomes. Moreover, the perception that 
pure procedural justice remains independent from substantive 
norms of justice is made possible by a twofold abstraction. First, 
the legal subjects who avail themselves of the relevant procedure 
are abstracted from (in the sense of being lifted out of) the 
lifeworld of their daily existence. Second, the relevant procedure is 
abstracted from the concrete material conditions and particular 
substantive norms on which it depends for its ultimate justiflcation. 
The second abstraction would be performed through lifting the rel­
evant procedure from its broader legitimating factual and norma­
tive context, and then focusing on this procedure so narrowly as to 
leave its factual and normative setting out of the resulting picture. 
The processes of abstraction present in both procedural and 
purely procedural justice, while operating somewhat differently, 
are ultimately relied upon to perform largely similar tasks. On the 
one hand, abstraction is supposed to sufflciently detach legal sub­
jects from the totality of their concrete trappings in order to place 
13 See MICHEL ROSENFELD, AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AND JUSTICE: A PHILOSOPHICAL 
AND CONSTITUTIONAL INQUIRY 42 (1991). 
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the spotlight on similarities among such subjects, while downplay­
ing the differences that set them apart. Accordingly, in the exam­
ple of gambling, the individuals involved are considered in relation 
to their placing bets and not in terms of their differing wealth, edu­
cation, social class, or family status. Similarly, in the context of the 
economic marketplace or of contract as a legitimate tool of proce­
dural justice, individuals are considered in their capacities as pro­
ducer, buyer, seller, or consumer rather than as men or women, 
rich or poor, or members of an ethnic majority or minority. 
In addition to lifting legal subjects out of their concrete socio­
political circumstances, abstraction serves to minimize or to con­
ceal reliance on contestable substantive norms when attempting to 
settle conflicts among legal subjects. Moreover, these two different 
tasks performed by abstraction are not independent from one an­
other, but rather, are closely connected. As already mentioned, 
the principal normative function of law in complex modem socie­
ties is to provide for just intersubjective dealings among legal sub­
jects who relate to each other as strangers. And, as between 
strangers, justice would seem to require, above all, that all those 
involved be treated as equals and that the customs, normative be­
liefs, and ethical commitments of some not be favored over those 
of others. Also, because one is most likely to perceive a stranger in 
terms of the ways he or she differs from the members of one's own 
group, justice among strangers seems to require conceptualizing 
the realm of intersubjective transactions at a level of abstraction 
that optimizes awareness of what strangers have in common. 
Where legal subjects relate to each other as strangers, proce­
dural justice becomes extremely important and promotes a brand 
of equality that clusters around similarities. Genuine equality, 
however, requires taking into account relevant differences as well 
as relevant similarities.^'^ Accordingly, procedural justice seems 
prone to overemphasize similarities, while underemphasizing dif­
ferences. Because of this, from the standpoint of achieving global 
justice, every move in the direction of the greater abstraction re­
quired by procedural justice should be paired with a move in the 
opposite direction in order to prevent the eradication of relevant 
differences. This latter move, moreover, may either be set in mo­
tion automatically, in the context of pure procedural justice operat­
ing under propitious material conditions and normative 
1'* Inequality results as much from treating those who are different as inferior as it does 
from imposing treatment as equals onto those whose relevant differences have been disre­
garded or suppressed. See id. at 222-24. 
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assumptions, or it may be triggered by the application of substan­
tive norms that counter the flight toward abstraction promoted by 
procedural justice. In short, the task of justice is to account for and 
reconcile relevant identities and relevant differences. Viewing law 
as a medium, the above proposition means that the formal equality 
derived from law, which conforms to procedural justice, must be 
reconciled with the substantive equality that properly incorporates 
differences. Furthermore, substantive equality can be promoted 
through the content of legal norms. 
Before turning to an examination of Habermas's proceduralist 
paradigm, in light of the preceding observations, there are two fur­
ther points about proceduralism in general which must be briefly 
mentioned. First, it does not necessarily follow that although 
proceduralism cannot do away with the need to embrace substan­
tive norms, pure procedural justice is impossible. Clearly, 
proceduralism cannot rise above substantive norms or appeal to 
universally valid substantive norms. However, this does not pre­
clude reliance on contestable substantive norms to the extent that 
such norms must be implicitly or explicitly embraced by all those 
confronted with the necessity of interacting with others, as legal 
subjects having to relate to each other as equals and as strangers. 
In other words, proceduralism may be acceptable in the context of 
contestable substantive norms. This is true provided that the latter 
norms cannot be legitimately contested by those who come under 
the sweep of the background assumptions and material conditions 
underlying the proceduralism under consideration. 
Second, a distinction must be drawn between what may be 
called "primary proceduralism" and what may be referred to as 
"derivative proceduralism." Under primary proceduralism, de­
ployment of the relevant procedure is both indispensable to and 
determinative of any outcome that may be considered legitimate. 
However, under derivative proceduralism, outcomes are ultimately 
determined and legitimated by something more fundamental than, 
or logically antecedent to, the relevant procedure. Consequently, 
the relevant procedure is relegated to an auxiliary or essentially 
rhetorical role. As an illustration, one can cite the difference be­
tween "pure" or "primary" social contract theory and derivative 
social contract theory: 
Pure social contract theory posits that the ultimate justification 
of all legitimate social and political institutions lies in the mutual 
consent of the individuals affected by such institutions. .. . De­
rivative ... social contract theories, on the other hand, recognize 
the social contract device, but do not rely at the deepest level on 
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mutual consent as the source of the legitimacy of social and 
political institutions.^^ 
Consistent with this distinction, Hobbes is an exponent of pure so­
cial contract theory, whereas Locke is an exponent of derivative 
social contract theory.^® In Locke's theory, the ultimate source of 
legitimacy is not the social contract itself, but rather the natural 
right to property. This right to property both prompts the passage 
from the state of nature to civil society and delimits the scope and 
function of the social contract.^' 
More generally, pure procedural justice requires primary 
proceduralism and is ultimately inconsistent with derivative 
proceduralism. Therefore, derivative proceduralism is not genuine 
proceduralism but rather substantive theory in procedural garb. 
II. 
Habermas's proceduralism, rooted in his discourse theory, 
emerges against the background of Hobbesian as well as Rawlsian 
contractarianism. Hobbesian contractarianism satisfies the re­
quirements of primary proceduralism yet remains morally arbi­
trary; Rawlsian contractarianism incorporates the standpoint of 
Kantian morality, but proves ultimately to belong to the realm of 
derivative proceduralism.^® In Hobbesian contractarianism, the 
contractual device both shapes and legitimates the contract of asso­
ciation, which marks the passage from the state of nature to civil 
society.^® The contractual device, moreover, performs a critical in-
tersubjective task both by mediating between the conflicting wills 
of individual contractors and yielding a common will, which differs 
from every individual will involved, yet is nothing but the product 
of a voluntary compromise among all the contractors.^" 
15 Michel Rosenfeld, Contract and Justice: The Relation Between Classical Contract Law 
and Social Contract Theory, 70 IOWA L. REV. 769, 857 (1985). 
15 See id. 
17 See id. at 857-58. 
18 See JORGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS; CONTRIBUTIONS TO A DIS­
COURSE THEORY OF LAW AND DEMOCRACY 449-50 (William Rehg trans., 1996). 
19 For a more detailed discussion of Hobbes's social contract theory, see Rosenfeld, 
supra note 15, at 849-50, 852-55, 858-59. 
20 In a paradigmatic contract between a buyer who wishes to obtain a coveted good as 
cheaply as possible, and a seller who wishes to sell that good as expensively as possible, the 
contract price will be set at a level that is higher than what the buyer wishes, but lower than 
that wished for by the seller. Moreover, the contract price has to be such that neither the 
buyer nor the seller prefers to walk away from the contract rather than entering into it. 
Thus, the conflict between the will of the buyer and that of the seller is settled upon agree­
ment on a contract price, which becomes the joint (intersubjective) will of buyer and seller 
but which transcends each of their (initial) individual wills. 
1996] RIGHTS, DEMOCRACY AND JUSTICE 801 
Also, in the context of Hobbesian contractarianism, the state 
of affairs resulting from implementation of the contract may com­
port with the requirements of pure procedural justice, provided 
certain material conditions and normative assumptions are satis­
fied. Those conditions and assumptions are the ones that underlie 
Adam Smith's conception of a market society in which the "invisi­
ble hand" of competition transforms the clash of private interests 
into a realization of the public interest.^^ In the context of the kind 
of atomistic competition envisaged by Adam Smith, contract serves 
to transform the products emanating from the arbitrary wills of in­
dividuals into building blocks for the emergence of the public 
interest. 
Absent atomistic market competition, and upon rejection of 
the Smithian conception of the relationship between the pursuit of 
private self-interest and promotion of the public interest, contract 
alone cannot serve to bridge the gap between private and public 
interest. Accordingly, contract loses its ability to produce pure 
procedural (distributive) justice. Furthermore, while still a me­
dium for mediation of conflicting wills, contract no longer serves as 
a means to transcend the arbitrary wills of individual contractors. 
Finally, in the context of atomistic competition, each contractor 
presumably has an equal opportunity to influence the shaping of 
the common will through joint and mutual contract, whereas in the 
absence of rough material equality among contractors, the superior 
bargaining power of some contractors allows them to have signifi­
cantly greater influence than others on the configuration of the in-
tersubjective will produced through contract.^^ In short, cut loose 
from its Smithian moorings, Hobbesian contractarianism in the end 
is both morally arbitrary as well as partial toward some of the 
contractors. 
21 For a more extended discussion of the relationship between Adam Smith's concep­
tion of a market society and the achievement of pure procedural justice through the imple­
mentation of contracts,, see Rosenfeld, supra note 15, at 873-77. 
22 Whereas it is obvious that the mere fact of contracting tends to lose its legitimating 
role in the context of a legal contract between two contractors with widely different bar­
gaining power, it is not immediately apparent that an analogous change takes place in the 
context of the social contract. Upon reflection, however, the analogy seems to hold to the 
extent that once the "invisible hand" premise is dropped, all the different conceptions of 
the good are not likely to fare equally well when subjected to the social contract device. 
Thus, for instance, communitarian and feminist conceptions of the good are much less 
compatible with the ideology of contract than are individualistic and atomistic conceptions. 
See, e.g., CAROL PATEMAN, THE SEXUAL CONTRACT 2,108 (1988) (social contract estab­
lishes a "fraternal patriarchy" through which men rule over women). Accordingly, if dif­
ferences had to be settled through a contractual agreement, atomistic individualists would 
have a built-in advantage over communitarians or feminists. 
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Rawlsian contractarianism proposes to resolve both of the de­
fects which plague its Hobbesian counterpart. To overcome moral 
arbitrariness, Rawls infuses his social contractors with Kantian 
moral universalism. Whereas Hobbesian contractors are motivated 
to enter into the social contract to secure indispensable social co­
operation on terms most favorable to the furtherance of their own 
arbitrary will, Rawlsian contractors seek to establish principles of 
justice upon which they could all equally agree.^^ Moreover, to 
avoid the pitfalls caused by differences in power among contractors 
and by partiality, Rawls places his hypothetical contractors behind 
a "veil of ignorance." This is designed to make it possible for con­
tractors to agree upon principles of justice without taking into ac­
count either their social position or their conception of the good.^'^ 
The veil of ignorance secures equality by allowing strangers to 
ascend to a higher level of abstraction. At this level they can dis­
cover the core of their common identity, unhampered by the power 
struggles and the clashing differences of their daily existence. 
Based on that new-found equality predicated on their common 
identity, strangers, through reciprocal recognition, can discover fair 
principles of justice to govern all of their intersubjective dealings. 
However, Rawls's use of the contract device at a higher level of 
abstraction comes at too high a cost. Indeed, in the course of es­
tablishing abstract equality behind the veil of ignorance, Rawls has 
sacrificed difference, has reduced the social contract from a dialogi-
cal to a monological device, and has unwittingly paved the way for 
the predominance of some perspectives which cannot be justified 
as being superior to those against which they compete.^^ 
Rawls's abstract equality behind the veil of ignorance is objec­
tionable to the extent that it drastically downplays difference in its 
search for a solid common core of identity. Genuine equality re­
quires taking into account relevant differences as well as relevant 
similarities. Rawls's contractors have been deprived of the means 
to perceive diversity, and are thus unable to factor relevant differ­
ences into their elaboration of fair principles of justice. Differences 
are also essential to the proper functioning of the institution of 
contract, as only contractors with different needs, desires, motiva­
tions, and resources are likely to seek out one another to negotiate 
a contractual exchange. Ultimately, Rawls's contractors behind 
23 See RAWLS, supra note 6, at 11-12. 
2'* See id. at 11. . . 
25 For an extended discussion of these shortcomings of Rawls's contractarianism, see 
ROSENFELD, supra note 13, at 233-31. 
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the veil of ignorance are reduced to the position of mere abstract 
egos.^® And since abstract egos are interchangeable, as identically 
constituted and uniform in perspective, individual conclusions 
would not differ from those reached in concert concerning legiti­
mate principles of justice. Under these circumstances, the contract 
device seems altogether superfluous, rendering Rawls's principles 
of justice monological rather than dialogical,^^ and his brand of 
contractarianism derivatively proceduralist at best. 
The most serious defect of the Rawlsian process of abstraction 
is that it ultimately makes it possible, under the guise of remaining 
neutral among different perspectives, for some perspectives to gain 
the upper hand over others. This results from the very means of 
abstraction that Rawls sets into motion in order to transform the 
totality of everyday individuals embedded in their particular socio­
political norms, institutions, customs, and practices into a collection 
of pure abstract egos acting as social contractors behind a veil of 
ignorance. Looking closely at this process of abstraction, a distinc­
tion can be drawn between physical differences and differences in 
perspective. For example, there is a difference between racial iden­
tity as a function of skin pigmentation and racial identity as the 
product of a distinct historical and cultural-based perspective. 
Now, we can accept that the veil of ignorance conceals differences 
based on skin pigmentation just as we can readily imagine a society 
that is not comprised of differences in skin color. However, if his­
torical events such as slavery and racial apartheid have created dis­
tinct perspectives, which by and large correspond to differences in 
skin color, then how can we go beyond these differences in per­
spective while discarding differences in skin pigmentation? If there 
is a universal perspective that transcends all particular perspec­
tives, proceduralism would be entirely superfluous or merely triv­
ial. Absent such a universal perspective, however, the abstract 
egos behind the veil of ignorance would have to adopt either a ra­
cial minority or a racial majority perspective in order to arrive at 
any common principles sufficient to sustain fair principles of jus-
26 [Under] Rawls'[s] original position ... common principles emerge only after all 
differences in life plans and in natural and social assets have been set aside. 
Under these circumstances, common principles are reached, not from a diver­
sity of perspectives that incorporates the multitude of existing differences, but 
from the mere abstract identity that equalizes all individual perspectives after 
having neutralized all the possible sources of individual differences. 
Id. at 234-35. 
27 This analysis is consistent with Habermas's assessment of Rawls's theory. See 
JORGEN HABERMAS, MORAL CONSCIOUSNESS AND COMMUNICATIVE ACTION 66 (Christian 
Lenhardt & Shierry W. Nicholsen trans., 1990). 
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tice. Under these circumstances, a racially influenced perspective 
becomes a material condition that is bound to have an impact on 
the selection of principles of justice, yet it remains concealed be­
hind the erasure of differences relating to skin pigmentation.^® 
Habermas's discourse-theoretical proceduralism provides the 
means to overcome the particular limitations of both Hobbesian 
and Rawlsian contractarianism. By relying on communicative ac­
tion—action oriented toward reaching understanding^^—as a 
means to generate consensus, Habermas provides a procedural ap­
proach that makes for a clear demarcation between the generation 
of intersubjective norms and their use to one's own advantage. 
Consistent with this demarcation, and as a consequence of exclud­
ing "strategic action"^" from the process designed to lead to the 
consensual adoption of intersubjective norms, Habermas provides 
a way to surmount the arbitrariness and lack of impartiality inher­
ent in Hobbesian contractarianism. Indeed, contract is, above all, 
the institution of choice to channel peaceful and orderly interaction 
among strategically oriented social actors. Accordingly, the use of 
contract to generate intersubjective norms seems destined to 
subordinate the perspective of the rulemaker to that of the strate­
gic actor who wishes to press his advantage as far as the rules per­
mit. However, from the standpoint of communicative action, 
where the focus is on reaching a consensus, both arbitrary will and 
the strategic actors' thirst for success seem sufficiently isolated and 
neutralized to move beyond the constraints inherent in Hobbesian 
contractarianism. 
Communicative action also provides the means to overcome 
the two principal defects of Rawlsian contractarianism—namely its 
inability to properly account for differences and its unintentional 
privileging of certain perspectives over others. Not only is every­
one supposed to participate in Habermas's discursive procedure 
for generating and validating intersubjective norms, but there is no 
28 For a more extended discussion of the role of race in shaping different perspectives 
in the context of American society, as well as the relation between such perspectives and 
norms of justice, see ROSENFELD, supra note 13, at ch. 9. 
29 For a comprehensive discussion of communicative action, see 1 JORGEN HABERMAS, 
THE THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION (Thomas McCarthy trans., 1984) [hereinafter 1 
HABERMAS, THE THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION], and 2 JORGEN HABERMAS, THE 
THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION (Thomas McCarthy trans., 1987). 
30 According to Habermas, in strategic action, "the actors are interested solely in the 
success, i.e., the consequences or outcomes of their actions, [and] they will try to reach their 
objectives by influencing their opponent's definition of the situation, and thus his decisions 
or motives, through external means by using weapons or goods, threats or enticements." 
HABERMAS, supra note 27, at 133. 
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veil of ignorance and everyone is free to introduce any matter of 
concern for discussion. Accordingly, differences are not eliminated 
ex ante, but are taken into full account; the ultimate decision as to 
which differences to count as relevant to be reached by consensus 
after full and uninhibited discussion. Moreover, Habermas's dia-
logical approach, unlike Rawls's contractarianism, is not reductive 
when it comes to taking different perspectives into account. In­
deed, not only does Habermas envisage taking all different per­
spectives into account, but he insists that his discursive procedure 
calls for the complete reversibility of the perspectives of all partici­
pants in communicative action.^^ In other words, Habermas's 
proceduralism requires, as a prerequisite to reaching a legitimate 
consensus, that conflicts presented for discursive resolution be con­
sidered by all participants from each and every perspective 
involved. 
Having thus set the procedural path free from unwarranted 
Hobbesian and Rawlsian constraints, Habermas proposes his 
proceduralist paradigm. According to this paradigm, the legiti­
macy of law is to be gauged from the standpoint of a collectivity of 
strangers who mutually recognize one another as equals and jointly 
engage in communicative action to establish a legal order to which 
they could all accord their unconstrained acquiescence. By means 
of communicative action, a reconstructive process is established 
through which the relevant group of strangers need only accept as 
legitimate those laws which they would all agree both to enact as 
autonomous legislators and to follow as law abiding subjects. 
In accordance with this proceduralism, legal subjects can con­
struct a perspective that enables them to view themselves simulta­
neously as the authors and the addressees of law. From that 
perspective, moreover, they may jointly determine which laws 
would be acceptable to them in their capacities as both authors and 
addressees. And, consistent with this proceduralism based on com­
municative action, democracy and rights not only can be reconciled 
but also apprehended as internally connected and mutually depen­
dent.^^ Indeed, absent the safeguards built in through communica-
31 See id. at 122. 
32 As Habermas states, 
a legal order is legitimate to the extent that it equally secures the co-original 
private and political autonomy of its citizens; at the same time, however, it owes 
its legitimacy to the forms of communication in which civic autonomy alone can 
express and prove itself. This is the key to a proceduralist understanding of 
law. 
JUrgen Habermas, Paradigms of Law, 17 CARDOZO L. REV. 771, 777 (1996). 
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tive action, democracy and rights remain at loggerheads since the 
only guarantee against oppression by legislative majorities would 
come from antimajoritarian rights limiting the scope of legitimate 
democratic lawmaking. However, from the standpoint of commu­
nicative action, the same rights, which those in the minority would 
otherwise grasp as shields against the majority, would loom as part 
of the same bundle of rights and freedoms which enables each 
member of the legal community to become integrated with every 
other member of that community. 
In addition to reconciling rights and democracy from the 
standpoint of communicative action, Habermas's proceduralist par­
adigm of law also offers innovative means to pursue the purely pro­
cedural achievement of justice. Indeed, as Habermas indicates, the 
principal task of the strangers who relate to each other as equal 
consociates under law is to reconcile the requirements of legal 
equality with those of factual equality.^^ In other words, through 
communicative action, legal actors are supposed to reach agree­
ment among themselves as to which factual similarities and differ­
ences ought to be taken into account by the law. As we have seen, 
Hobbesian contractarianism shortchanges the demands of justice 
to the extent that its proceduralism favors recognition of the identi­
ties and differences dear to the most powerful. Likewise, Rawlsian 
contractarianism also proves inadequate because, among other 
things, its removal of certain differences ex ante renders it only de­
rivatively procedural. Finally, substantive resolutions of the prob­
lem of justice necessitate recourse to justice beyond law, which 
compels favoring certain conceptions of the good over others. In 
light of these alternatives, Habermas's procedural proposal seems 
particularly attractive for at least two important reasons: first, it 
allows all identities and differences to be considered while weeding 
out strategic uses of them; and second, it requires subjecting all of 
the identities and differences to every one of the perspectives rep­
resented by participants in communicative action. Accordingly, 
Habermas's proceduralism promises to reconcile legal and factual 
equality in a way that not only accounts for all existing identities 
and differences, but that also takes into consideration the impor­
tance of every asserted identity and difference for each of the dif­
ferent perspectives represented in communicative action. 
The reconciliation of legal and factual equality is a paramount 
task for postmetaphysical justice. As Habermas notes, however, 
the two postmetaphysical legal paradigms—namely the liberal-
33 See id. at 778-79. 
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bourgeois paradigm and the social-welfare paradigm (which he 
seeks to replace with his proceduralist paradigm)—have not satis­
factorily dealt with the nexus between legal and factual equality.^'* 
The liberal-bourgeois paradigm reduces justice to the equal distri­
bution of rights, thus basically ignoring factual equality.^^ The so­
cial-welfare paradigm, on the other hand, seeks to remedy this 
deficiency by zeroing in on the eradication of factual inequality, 
and in so doing reduces justice to distributive justice.^^ As a conse­
quence of this, in order to achieve factual equality, the dignity and 
autonomy of those who must be clients of the welfare state become 
substantially undermined.^"' 
The material conditions underlying the emergence of 
Habermas's proceduralist paradigm of law thus include both the 
successive existences and failures of the liberal-bourgeois and so­
cial-welfare paradigms. The liberal-bourgeois paradigm relies pri­
marily on a formal conception of equality that clearly places 
identity above differences.^® The social-welfare paradigm, in con­
trast, fosters a material conception of equality that places differ­
ences and the need to account for differences in the forefront, 
leaving equality as identity in the background. 
From the broader perspective of the struggle for equality, 
originating in the repudiation of the feudal order, one can observe 
an intertwining dialectic between identity and difference as well as 
between equality and inequality. A brief look into this dialectic is 
warranted at this point in order to place the struggle to reconcile 
legal and factual equality, and the three paradigms of law discussed 
thus far, in a broader context. This should make for a more thor­
ough picture of the background and normative assumptions and of 
the material conditions surrounding Habermas's proceduralist par­
adigm of law. 
In the struggle against feudal hierarchy, equality as identity 
achieved predominance, as clearly evinced in the American Decla­
ration of Independence's famous phrase, "All men are created 
equal." Moreover, the emergence of equality as identity being a 
rallying point for eighteenth century bourgeois revolutionaries is 
34 See id. at 776-80. 
35 See id. 
36 See id. 
37 See id. 
38 In other words, in the liberal-bourgeois paradigm, rights are distributed equally to 
everyone since every individual is considered identical to every other individual as a being 
who is inherently entitled to have rights. But if (material) differences among individuals 
tend to be downplayed, inequalities in the capacity to exercise rights will be disregarded. 
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set against the feudal order's association of difference with hierar­
chical relations between superiors and inferiors. In other words, in 
this particular setting, equality goes hand in hand with identity 
whereas inequality is coupled with difference. Consistent with this 
view, the pursuit of equality as identity is to promote the establish­
ment of equal dignity of citizens regardless of status or birth. 
There are, however, other contexts in which equality as iden­
tity can be used as a weapon against treating all members of society 
as equals.^® This occurs when equality has to be purchased at the 
price of giving up cherished differences; for example, when equal 
membership in a polity is conditioned on the adoption of an official 
religion which may require repudiating or suppressing one's own 
religious preferences. More generally, in terms of the dynamics be­
tween identity, difference, equality, and inequality, whether equal­
ity as identity ultimately contributes to, or frustrates, treating every 
member of society as an equal depends on whether equality as 
identity is pursued in a setting that is best characterized by the met­
aphor of the master and the slave or by that of the colonizer and 
the colonized. Indeed, the master treats the slave as inferior be­
cause he is different, whereas the colonizer offers the colonized 
equal treatment provided that the latter give up his own language, 
culture, and religion and adopt those of the colonizer.''" Accord­
ingly, in a master-slave setting, equality as identity is a weapon of 
liberation whereas in a colonizer-colonized setting, it is a weapon 
of domination."' 
The dialectic between equality as identity and equality as dif­
ference unfolds in the context of the struggle for equality against 
the backdrop of commitment to prescriptive equality—that is, ac­
cepting, as a normative proposition, that all persons are inherently 
equal autonomous moral agents. Moreover, a discrepancy exists 
39 Following Dworkin's distinction, equal treatment—that is, giving to each the same 
thing—must be contrasted with treating persons as equals—that is, as possessors of the 
same inherent worth and dignity. See RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 227 
(1977). 
40 For a more extended discussion of these issues, see ROSENFELD, supra note 13, at 
222-24. 
41 A clear example of this contrast is furnished by the constitutional treatment of racial 
differences in the United States. At the time when racial apartheid was constitutionally 
sanctioned, the slogan "the constitution is colorblind" was a weapon used against the de­
nial of equal dignity to African-Americans. See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 552 
(1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting). In the context of modem day claims to entitlement of af­
firmative action, as a remedy against the lingering effects of past discrimination, however, 
"the constitution is colorblind" has become the rallying point for those who refuse to re­
dress continuing inequities against African-Americans. See, e.g., Paul C. Roberts, The Rise 
of the New Inequality, WALL ST. J., Dec. 6,1995, at A20. 
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between the ideal of prescriptive equality, which requires a recon­
ciliation of legal and factual equality accounting for all relevant 
identities and differences, and the conception of equality embraced 
by active combatants in the struggle for equality. As long as the 
full realization of the ideal of prescriptive equality remains elusive, 
combatants struggling for equality seem bound to embrace posi­
tions more tilted toward identity or difference, according to 
whether they wage their fight against particular inequalities grafted 
upon particular differences or, on the contrary, against inequalities 
maintained through exploitation of certain identities. In as much 
as the tilt required to combat inequality unduly sweeps ideally rele­
vant identities or differences, the struggle for equality forces its 
protagonists to temporally forgo the acknowledgment of certain 
identities or differences that ultimately must figure in any legiti­
mate reconciliation between legal and factual equality. Finally, the 
dialectic between identity and difference assuredly compensates for 
deviations that tilt too far toward identity or difference, without 
ever reconciling the path of the struggle for equality with the one 
carved by the ideal of prescriptive equality. 
Regardless of whether questions of justice can ultimately be 
determined independently from questions concerning conceptions 
of the good, from the standpoint of those engaged in the struggle 
for equality, how much equality there should be and for whom is 
always embedded within the limited horizon of a concrete concep­
tion of the good. To the extent that the struggle for equality is 
likely to involve more than two protagonists, a protagonist's tilt 
toward identity or difference in dealing with one antagonist may 
come back to haunt that protagonist when confronting another an­
tagonist. Thus, for example, from the perspective of the generation 
that carried out the American Revolution and adopted the Consti­
tution, their tilt toward identity, reflected in the phrase "all rnen 
are created equal," was undoubtedly useful in the struggle against 
Britain's monarchy. That same tilt, however, proves to be a nui­
sance if not a downright obstacle in the context of establishing a 
constitutional democracy that recognizes the institution of slavery 
as lawful.^2 This example is admittedly extreme in that the per-
42 It is noteworthy that the United States Constitution of 1787 implicitly recognizes the 
legal validity of slavery. See, e.g., U.S. CONST, art. I, §§ 2,9. Neither does the Constitution 
contain equality rights, thus remaining at odds with the 1776 Declaration of Independence. 
It would not be until after the Civil War that the Constitution would be amended to repu­
diate slavery, and establish equality rights. U.S. CONST, amends. XII, XIV. For a thorough 
and enlightening discussion of these issues, see David A.J. Richards, Revolution and Con­
stitutionalism in America, 14 CARDOZO L. REV. 577 (1993). 
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spective embraced by America's founding generation leads to a 
blatant contradiction, unless one is prepared to proceed as if slaves 
were less than human.'*^ Even in more mundane cases, however, 
there is likely to be a tension, if not a contradiction, between the 
tilt one is forced to assume in one's struggle for equality and the 
optimal amount of interplay between legal and factual equality 
consistent with one's perspective grounded in one's own concep­
tion of the good. In sum, considering that the struggle for equality 
is waged from multiple perspectives and against many differently 
positioned antagonists, the dialectic between equality and inequal­
ity generates tilts, either in the direction of identity or difference, 
which require correction. Overly sweeping claims are also gener­
ated, which require adjustment to become better (without ever be­
coming fully) reconciled with the comprehensive perspective from 
which they are made. Thus, the interplay between identity and dif­
ference must be treated as though it were a dynamic process affect­
ing both the configuration and the scope of equality at any given 
time and place. 
Consistent with the preceding analysis, from the standpoint of 
every perspective shaped by a particular conception of the good 
(which is compatible at the highest levels of abstraction with pre­
scriptive equality), the reconciliation between legal and factual 
equality must satisfy two distinct and, at least to some degree, in­
compatible requirements. First, such reconciliation should satisfy 
the optimal relationship between identity and difference within the 
conception of the good espoused by the relevant perspective. Sec­
ondly, such reconciliation should level the playing field between 
the existing tilts and excesses that result from the ongoing struggle 
for equality among representatives of different perspectives. If the 
desired balance is not achieved, the optimal mix between identity 
and difference could not properly be set in motion in order to be­
come effective. On the other hand, achievement of the desired bal­
ance requires reliance on certain identities and differences that are 
bound to upset, or at least postpone, the implementation of the 
optimal mix. 
The three paradigms of law discussed by Habermas can now 
be put in context, both in terms of the dynamic struggle for equal­
ity, and in terms of competing perspectives on equality and justice. 
In terms of the struggle for equality, there is a dynamic progression 
from the tilt toward identity of the liberal-bourgeois paradigm, to 
Shamefully, this is what the United States Supreme Court did in its infamous Dred 
Scott decision. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857). 
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the tilt toward difference of the social-welfare paradigm, and fi­
nally to the attempt to incorporate, reconcile, and balance the vir­
tues of liberal identity and social-welfare difference within the 
proceduralist paradigm proposed by Habermas. Therefore, as 
against the two paradigms which it seeks to replace, Habermas's 
proceduralist paradigm appears to have significantly levelled the 
field on which the battle for the optimal reconciliation of legal and 
factual equality must be fought. This, however, does not necessar­
ily imply that Habermas's paradigm levels the field sufficiently as 
between the competing perspectives it encompasses, or that it can 
yield any reconciliation of legal and factual equality that would be 
acceptable to all the encompassed perspectives. 
Focusing on the issue of the perspectives encompassed within 
Habermas's proceduralist paradigm, three important questions 
arise. First, does Habermas's proceduralist paradigm, by the very 
nature of communicative action, effectively exclude certain per­
spectives? Second, does the proceduralist paradigm provide a 
workable means of achieving a genuine consensus among the com­
peting perspectives it encompasses regarding the optimal mix of 
identities and differences, in relation to the legitimate reconcilia­
tion of legal and factual equality? And, third, does the procedural­
ist paradigm provide an adequate means of leveling the field on 
which the perspectives it encompasses compete for justice and 
equality? Phrased somewhat differently, these three questions can 
be restated as: (1) which perspectives can expect justice under 
Habermas's proceduralism?; (2) can such proceduralism produce 
justice among different perspectives?; and (3) can such procedural­
ism yield equal justice as gauged from within each of the encom­
passed perspectives? 
Consistent with Habermas, in answering the first question it is 
clear that some perspectives are effectively excluded from the dis­
cursive resolution of questions concerning justice. Thus, all per­
spectives that could be broadly characterized as metaphysical 
perspectives—including those framed by religious dogma and ide­
ology—would effectively be excluded or, more precisely, would ef­
fectively exclude themselves from any dialogical process designed 
to resolve issues of justice. To be sure, this is not problematic for 
Habermas's proceduralist paradigm since he makes it clear that his 
paradigm is designed for postmetaphysical conflicts over justice. 
The exclusion of metaphysical perspectives is noteworthy. It un­
derscores that communicative action is not neutral as between all 
conceptions of the good, even if in the final analysis it remained 
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neutral among the different conceptions of the good that are not 
incompatible with it. 
Communicative action effectively excludes not only metaphys­
ical perspectives but also nonmetaphysical ones that reject adher­
ence to prescriptive equality. Indeed, there seems to be little point, 
from the standpoint of nonmetaphysical perspective adherents 
(who maintain that some are inherently superior), to submit their 
views concerning justice for discussion with those whom they do 
not consider as equals. Even if convincing the unworthy is not 
deemed futile, communicative action by its very structure would 
still remain manifestly unfavorable toward blatantly inegalitarian 
ideologies that altogether reject prescriptive equality. In short, it 
remains to be seen whether Habermas's proceduralism is neutral as 
between the perspectives it encompasses. However, the exclusion 
consistent with Habermas's proceduralism of metaphysical and 
nonmetaphysical hierarchical perspectives indicates that it is ulti­
mately tied to certain substantive normative assumptions, albeit 
negative ones. 
The answer to the second question—namely, whether commu­
nicative action can carve out a common ground for justice encom­
passing all of its perspectives—depends on the nature of the 
procedural devices involved in communicative action as well as on 
the existence of material conditions making it plausible for the re­
versal of perspectives (undertaken by actors engaged in communi­
cative action) to generate fruitful consensuses or compromises. As 
conceived by Habermas, communicative action requires each par­
ticipant to have an equal opportunity to present claims for consid­
eration and a universal commitment to be swayed only by the force 
of the better argument."*^ Thus, the only legitimate normative regu­
lations under Habermas's proceduralist paradigm would be those 
which have been assented to by all the participants in rational dis­
courses who might be affected."*^ Moreover, in the context of legal 
as opposed to moral norms, Habermas stipulates that assent could 
be based on bargaining and compromise as well as on consensus."*® 
Finally—and an important advance over Rawlsian contractarian-
ism—the needs, wants, and interests of participants in communica­
tive action are not taken by Habermas to be immutable; rather 
they are subject to evolution and transformation pursuant to dia-
For a comprehensive discussion of communicative action, see 1 HABERMAS, THE 
THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION, supra note 29, at 273-337. 
•*5 See HABERMAS, supra note 18, at 459-60. 
•^6 See id. at 460. 
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logical exchanges. Because communicative action, as conceived by 
Habermas, can contribute to the formation of opinions and wills, 
it is not simply relegated to finding overlapping interests; it is also 
equipped to harmonize interests through dialogical transformation. 
In view of the characteristics of Habermas's proceduralism, 
there are at least three significant impediments to the goal of 
achieving an accord on justice among representatives of the diverse 
perspectives engaged in communicative action. First, the reconcili­
ation of perspectives might ultimately prove to be a purely contin­
gent matter. In that case, Habermas's proceduralism would prove 
inadequate because under many plausible circumstances it would 
fail to lead to any legitimate reconciliation of legal and factual 
equality. 
One way to avoid this latter possibility is by emphasizing the 
requirement of rationality. Indeed, if rationality is called for by 
communicative action in the selection of ends, in dealing with the 
means toward one's ends, and in dealing with conflicts that exist 
among persons who pursue different ends, then attaining an accord 
on justice may no longer be contingent. But that leads to the sec­
ond problem. If the requirement of rationality is strong enough to 
foreclose the contingency of an accord, then that accord is depen­
dent on the operative norm of rationality rather than on dialogical 
reciprocity. Consequently, Habermas's proceduralism would be­
come essentially derivative. 
Relying upon bargaining and compromise, as well as on con­
sensus coupled with emphasis on the transformability of needs, 
provides an alternative way to minimize the chance that the 
proceduralist paradigm will fail to yield an accord. This last alter­
native, however, leads to the third problem. If the pressure to 
reach an accord is intense, then bargaining and compromising— 
even if they remain free of strategic action—may favor certain per­
spectives over others (as contrasted with certain individuals over 
others). If that were the case, Habermas's proceduralism would 
fail to remain neutral as between the perspectives which it encom­
passes (much like Hobbesian contractarianism proved unable to 
remain neutral as between all contractors). 
The preceding observations fail to identify any definitive an­
swer to the second question. However, they raise significant 
doubts whether Habermas's proceduralism alone, unsupported by 
47 See id. at 461-62. 
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substantive norms, can reliably lead to an accord on justice among 
different perspectives without favoring some of those perspectives. 
The last of the three questions—namely, can the proceduralist 
paradigm level the field on which competing perspectives vie for 
justice—as with the second, cannot presently be given anything 
nearing a definitive answer. To the extent that proceduralism's 
search for an accord on justice leads to the favoring of some per­
spectives, the third question would seem to require a negative an­
swer. However, assuming an accord could be reached without 
having to favor any of the relevant perspectives, the success of 
Habermas's proceduralism to level the playing field would appear 
to depend on whether the requisite leveling could be achieved 
through dialogue, or whether it calls for predialogical or extradia-
logical adjustments. To further clarify these matters, I now turn to 
an important feminist objection to Habermas's proceduralism. 
III. 
The feminist challenge to Habermas's proceduralism is partic­
ularly serious since it is launched from a perspective that is neither 
metaphysical nor hierarchical in nature. Moreover, the feminist 
challenge attacks Habermas's proceduralism on at least two differ­
ent levels. On one level feminists can argue, even assuming com­
municative action remains neutral between feminist and male-
oriented perspectives,''® the respective needs, wants, and interests 
of each are given such disparate interpretations that it is not realis­
tic to expect any general agreement on how to reconcile legal and 
factual equality. On another level, feminists can argue that discur­
sive proceduralism cannot level the playing field which has tradi­
tionally heavily tilted toward male-oriented perspectives. 
Additionally, feminists could press the more radical claim that by 
its very structure communicative action favors male-oriented per­
spectives over feminist ones. Consequently, no purely dialogical 
determination of the relation between legal and factual equality 
could ever prove genuinely acceptable to feminists. 
Habermas agrees with the feminists that both the liberal-bour­
geois and the social-welfare paradigms evince biases against wo-
^*8 It is important to remember that what distinguishes feminist perspectives from male-
oriented ones are primarily gender-related differences. These differences are largely socio-
cultural constructs rather than differences merely based on sex. Furthermore, while femi­
nist perspectives may more likely be embraced by women than by men, certain men are 
genuinely feminists just as certain women side with antifeminists. 
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men.'*^ However, he disagrees with the feminists when it comes to 
the proceduralist paradigm. Essentially, Habermas's response to 
the feminist challenge is that since gender differences are con­
structed and not pre-established, conflicts between feminist and 
male-oriented views should be amenable to dialogical resolution 
just as other interperspectival conflicts.^" 
To determine whether Habermas's proceduralism can success­
fully overcome the feminist challenge, it is first necessary to take a 
closer look at some of that challenge's principal characteristics. 
Moreover, since there is by no means unanimity among feminists, I 
shall take a reconstructive approach and combine various elements 
that have figured in feminist critiques, while advancing the most 
effective good faith feminist challenge possible. Also, as gender-
related issues may vary among cultures, I will only refer to gender-
related issues as they arise in the United States. 
The feminist challenge in the United States is premised upon a 
constitutional, legal, cultural, and social tradition that has repeat­
edly used and/or constructed differences between men and women 
to the detriment of the latter, in order to perpetuate a male domi­
nated society. In that society, with its male-oriented institutions, 
the best women can hope for is that gender differences will not be 
used against them. In other words, women's only realistic escape 
from being subordinated has required them to settle as being colo­
nized^^ in a male run colony. From the standpoint of the relation­
ship between legal and factual equality, women have generally 
experienced two different regimes during the course of American 
history. Initially, the relationship between legal and factual equal­
ity unfolded in a setting tilted toward difference, with differences 
being, for the most part, weighted against women.^^ More recently, 
the tilt has shifted toward identity, but women still have been sig­
nificantly disadvantaged, in as much as identity has essentially 
meant conformity with male identity.®^ 
It is against this background of exploited differences and co­
erced identities that feminists may construct a comprehensive per-
See Habermas, supra note 32, at 781-82. 
50 See id. at 783-84; see also supra pp. 796-98. 
51 See the distinction between master/slave and colonizer/colonized relationships, supra 
notes 40-41 and accompanying text. 
52 See, e.g., Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130 (1873) (state refusal to allow 
women to practice law held constitutional on grounds that a woman's proper role was that 
of a wife and mother). 
53 See Martha Minow, Justice Engendered, 101 HARV. L. REV. 10 (1987) (arguing that 
Supreme Court adjudication on sexual discrimination and pregnancy has posited men's 
experience as the "norm" against which women are measured). 
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spective, with a vision of the good based upon a recasting of 
identities and differences in ways that are likely to be liberating 
and enriching for women. Inspired by Carol Gilligan's vision, fem­
inists might construct a conception of the good stressing intimacy, 
attachment, interdependence, care, concern, responsibility, and 
self-sacrifice.^'' Such a feminist conception of the good would 
sharply contrast with its typical male-oriented counterpart, empha­
sizing separation, competition, and achievement.^^ 
Now, let us suppose that representatives of the above-
sketched feminist perspective (to whom I shall refer as "the femi­
nists") confront representatives of the typical male-oriented per­
spective (to whom I shall refer as "the masculinists"), and that they 
jointly endeavor to reach a dialogical consensus on a mutually ac­
ceptable reconciliation of legal and factual equality. Let us sup­
pose, further, that from the outset the feminists stipulate that they 
concede that the proceduralist paradigm is neutral as between mas-
culinist and feminist perspectives. Under these circumstances, the 
feminists will start the confrontation by recounting the history of 
sex discrimination and will argue for the adoption of legal norms 
that would enhance care, responsibility, and meeting the needs of 
concrete others.^^ The masculinists, on the other hand, while ac­
knowledging past inequities, will propose legal norms emphasizing 
autonomy and fair competition which would preclude gender-
based discrimination. 
Assuming that no legal norm capable of equally satisfying the 
masculinists and the feminists were to emerge at that point, our 
protagonists could proceed to engage in a reversal of perspectives. 
This would allow them not only to achieve greater empathy toward 
their antagonists' plight, but also to become aware of the relative 
importance of each particular claim from within the comprehensive 
perspective it originated. Awareness of the relative importance of 
See CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY AND WO­
MEN'S DEVELOPMENT 12, 73-74, 132 (1982). Gilligan is concerned with morals, not law. 
Her views, however, have influenced feminist legal theorists. See e.g., Ellen C. DuBois et 
al.. Feminist Discourse, Moral Values, and the Law—A Conversation, 34 BUFF. L. REV. 11 
(1985). For a critique of Gilligan by a feminist legal theorist, see Jeanne L. Schroeder, 
Feminism Historicized: Medieval Misogynist Stereotypes in Contemporary Feminist Juris­
prudence, 75 IOWA L. REV. 1135, 1141 n.l2 (1990). 
55 Habermas has rejected the validity of Gilligan's challenge relating to issues in the 
theory of moral development. See HABERMAS, supra note 27, at 175-84. That controversy, 
however, has no direct bearing on the use of Gilligan's work to outline the contours of a 
plausible feminist conception of the good. 
55 Cf. GILLIGAN, supra note 54, at 11 (contrasting men's tendency to focus on "the 
generalized other" with women's draw toward the "particular other"). 
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conflicting claims within their respective perspectives might prove 
quite helpful—it would be rational to sacrifice a claim of lesser im­
portance within one's own perspective to accommodate a claim 
that within another perspective is much more important. Such a 
sacrifice would be rational (in the sense of rationality of means 
rather than rationality of ends) considering the potential for recip­
rocal gestures that would ultimately inure to the benefit of all those 
involved. 
Now, let us assume that after ranking all wants and interests 
and abandoning the pursuit of those which rank lower in the hier­
archy, in order to facilitate the realization of those which rank 
higher, the masculinists and the feminists still have not been able to 
settle on equally acceptable legal norms. At that point, it is possi­
ble that each would try to convince the other to change their needs 
and wants. Thus the feminists would argue that competition is not 
everything and greater connectedness could enrich the lives of the 
masculinists. The masculinists would try to impress upon the femi­
nists that competition is not as bad as they think, particularly if it is 
scrupulously rid of all vestiges of gender discrimination. 
At that point in the dialogue, it is possible that a consensus 
regarding legal norms might be reached. But it is equally possible 
that a consensus on equally acceptable legal norms might never be 
reached. The inability of reaching a consensus would not occur be­
cause of any strategic behavior, but simply because the honestly 
held divergent conceptions of the good, even after accounting for 
all the concessions and adjustments mentioned above, would re­
main too far apart. 
Thus far I have assumed that the feminists do not challenge 
the proposition that the proceduralist paradigm is neutral as be­
tween the feminist and the masculinist perspectives. There are, 
however, several plausible reasons which would lend support to 
such a challenge. Furthermore, the feminists could bring either a 
moderate or a radical challenge against the proposition regarding 
proceduralist neutrality. 
For the moderate challenge, feminists would argue that the 
procedural guarantees afforded by dialogical proceduralism are in­
sufficient to level the playing field since public discourse has histor­
ically been heavily tilted toward masculinist perspectives, as have 
the liberal-bourgeois paradigms and the social-welfare paradigms 
and most existing legal norms. Given that masculinist views are so 
entrenched in the ideology and the institutional structures of the 
polity, to have an equal opportunity to present one's claims and to 
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attempt to transform existing needs, wants, and interests, seems 
fairly unlikely to balance the conflicting positions. This is true not 
because of any strategic conduct by the masculinists, but rather be­
cause they are so deeply set in their ways. 
Even assuming its validity, the moderate challenge may not be 
fatal to proceduralism, since even deeply entrenched positions 
could change over time. However, time is not a trivial matter when 
it comes to legitimating legal norms. If meaningful changes in 
opinion- and will-formation can be expected to take several gener­
ations, then exclusive reliance on dialogical proceduralism would 
seem undesirable and inadequate. 
Much more threatening to discursive proceduralism is the rad­
ical feminist challenge. That challenge takes as its first point of 
argument Gilligan's view that men's ethics are oriented toward 
rights, equality, and fairness, while women's are oriented toward 
responsibilities, equity, and the recognition of differences in need 
among concrete others.^' Suppose the masculinists and the femi­
nists incorporate, as part of their conceptions of the good, the 
views that Gilligan ascribes respectively to men and to women. 
Feminists could then launch the following attack. By its very struc­
ture—which is designed to lead to justice, equality, and rights—the 
proceduralist paradigm is inherently biased in favor of masculinist 
perspectives, against feminist perspectives. Ironically, because it 
provides for a reversal of perspectives, the proceduralist paradigm 
does not exclude expression of the needs, interests, or desires of 
feminists and even allows for masculinist empathy toward feminist 
claims. But those virtues are eventually nullified, in that, by its 
very nature, the proceduralist paradigm channels all intersubjective 
conflicts toward resolutions that must comport with justice, equal­
ity, and rights. Although the proceduralist paradigm gives the im­
pression of treating feminists as full partners in the dialogical 
process, the very structure of that process forces feminists to sup­
press their most fundamental differences in order to obtain a mea­
sure of recognition that does not seriously threaten the hegemony 
of masculinist perspectives. In short, the proceduralist paradigm 
makes it possible for an individual feminist claim to be given prior­
ity over a competing masculinist claim, but it forecloses something 
much more fundamental from a feminist perspective—the replace­
ment of "the hierarchy of rights with a web of relationships. 
57 See id. at 164. 
58 Id. at 57. 
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In defense of the legitimacy of the proceduralist paradigm, it 
could be argued that if the radical feminist challenge proves any­
thing, it proves too much. Because its targets include justice, 
equality, and rights as such, rather than any particular conception 
of them, the radical feminist challenge implies that law itself cannot 
possibly be justified as a medium for legitimate intersubjective in­
teraction. Therefore, the radical feminist challenge would ulti­
mately lead to a social universe devoid of law, in which feminists 
would either forcibly convert those who would oppose the imple­
mentation of their conception of the good, or their antagonists 
would go their own separate way. 
Feminists, however, could argue that their radical challenge 
does not necessarily have the dire implications mentioned above. 
Viewed more closely, the radical feminist challenge is not against 
law itself, but against a paradigm of law which is buttressed by a 
particular conception of law and rights. Following this line of rea­
soning, a brief focus on Habermas's conception of rights reveals 
that while he is open as to the content of legal rights, he clearly 
embraces a "static" rather than a "dynamic" conception of law as a 
medium of intersubjective interaction.^® In Habermas's view, legal 
rights (as opposed to moral rights) are above all entitlements, 
which are logically prior to the duties they trigger.^" Therefore, 
such rights carve out boundaries which tend to separate the 
rightholder from those who must assume a duty as a consequence 
of his or her entitlement. In the context of a dynamic jurispru­
dence such as the common law, however, because of the presence 
of greater flexibility, open-endedness, and indeterminacy, rights 
and duties become the product of interaction among legal actors; 
thus, they are always susceptible to further perfection through 
cooperation.®^ 
59 See Arthur J. Jacobson, The Idolatry of Rules: Writing Law According to Moses, With 
Reference to Other Jurisprudences, 11 CARDOZO L. REV. 1079,1125 (1990); see also Arthur 
J. Jacobson, Hegel's Legal Plenum, 10 CARDOZO L. REV, 877, 889-90 (1989) [hereinafter 
Jacobson, Hegel]. For present purposes, the key distinction between these two jurispru­
dences is that dynamic jurisprudences are open-ended and primarily concerned with the 
realization and development of legal personality. Static jurisprudences are primarily con­
cerned with instituting legal order and, accordingly, draw sharp lines between legal rela­
tionships and other intersubjective relationships which remain essentially beyond the reach 
of law. 
50 In Habermas's own words, "[wjhereas in morality an inherent symmetry exists be­
tween rights and duties, legal duties only result as consequences of the protection of entitle­
ments, which are conceptually prior." HABERMAS, supra note 18, at 451. 
51 Cf. Jacobson, Hegel, supra note 59, at 890-91 (in the common law system persons 
cannot interact without generating rights and duties, yet cannot know what those rights 
and duties are until after they have interacted). 
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With the distinction between static and dynamic jurispru­
dences in mind, the feminists can argue that their radical challenge 
does not demand the abolition of law, justice, equality, and 
rights—it calls only for the replacement of the proceduralist para­
digm and its static conception of rights with an alternative para­
digm creating a dynamic conception of rights. This alternative 
paradigm would alter the importance of justice, equality, and 
rights, by balancing them against normative standards designed to 
enhance promotion of the "web of relationships." Moreover, any 
alternative paradigm of law designed to be consistent with the radi­
cal feminist challenge, could neither be exclusively dialogical nor 
merely procedural. It would have to press substantive feminist 
norms against masculinist objections, thus having to rely on predia-
logical or extradialogical sources of legitimacy. 
Proponents of legal proceduralism may object to any alterna­
tive feminist paradigm which would countenance the imposition of 
feminist norms over masculinist objections arguing the paradigm 
would be arbitrary or inconsistent with a commitment to prescrip­
tive equality. Feminists however could counter, arguing that their 
proposed alternative paradigm would neither be arbitrary nor in 
violation of the dictates of prescriptive equality. Focusing on the 
dialectics between identity and difference, and between equality 
and inequality, feminists could claim that progress toward an opti­
mal reconciliation of legal and factual equality has always been 
achieved through a series of thrusts that overshoot their intended 
target, thereby tilting legal paradigms toward certain conceptions 
of the good to the detriment of other conceptions. This state of 
affairs requires compensation which necessitates generating a tilt 
toward the opposite direction. Therefore, the feminist alternative 
paradigm, with all its bias, is a logical moment in the ongoing strug­
gle to reach an optimal reconciliation of legal and factual equality. 
Consequently, such an alternative feminist paradigm is neither ar­
bitrary nor contrary to prescriptive equality. 
Based on the above examination of the feminist objection to 
Habermas's proceduralist paradigm of law, it is now possible to 
give a more complete answer to the two questions left open at the 
end of the Part II. First, unaided by additional substantive norms, 
legal proceduralism cannot be expected to produce justice among 
different perspectives within its domain. Second, proceduralism 
alone fails to yield equal justice as gauged from within each of the 
encompassed perspectives. 
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IV. 
Considering that pluralism implies a lack of agreement regard­
ing substantive norms, it would seem to be the most promising ally 
of pure procedural justice. Ideally, proceduralism should save plu­
ralism from the embarrassment of having to choose among the var­
ious competing conceptions of the good it encompasses. However, 
pluralism and pure procedural justice are ultimately incompatible. 
Conversely, whereas a community that shares the same substantive 
norms may seem to have no use for mere procedural justice, pure 
procedural justice can assume a legitimate role in the context of 
shared substantive norms, as indicated by the gambling example 
discussed earlier.®^ If these observations are correct, then 
Habermas's legal proceduralism may be vindicated to the extent 
that it is confined to contexts regulated by shared substantive 
norms. Moreover, while such vindication may fall quite short of 
pluralist expectations, it is by no means trivial. 
Before looking into the relationship between pluralism and 
pure procedural justice, a distinction concerning pluralism must be 
briefly addressed. Pluralism may either be methodological or com­
prehensive. Methodological pluralism can be characterized as a 
tool designed to prevent any substantive conception of the good 
from achieving a dominant position in the public sphere. Compre­
hensive pluralism, on the other hand, is a full-fledged substantive 
perspective encompassing a particular conception of the good 
which requires the inclusion and protection of different substantive 
perspectives that can be accommodated peacefully within the pol­
ity. The distinction between these two kinds of pluralism raises the 
following question: Since comprehensive pluralism relies on 
shared substantive norms, is it not then compatible with pure pro­
cedural justice? As we shall see, the answer to this question is 
eventually negative, even though comprehensive pluralism reserves 
an important but limited role for proceduralism. 
To get a better understanding of the relationship between plu­
ralism and proceduralism, it is useful to refer back to the image of 
transcommunal market relationships among strangers.^^ At first, 
one can assume that the market where strangers came to exchange 
goods was an important yet occasional focus for intersubjective 
dealings. Under these circumstances, the market required trans-
communal laws to regulate dealings among strangers and to stabi-
See supra pp. 796-98. 
See supra notes 20-27 and accompanying text. For a more extended discussion, see 
Rosenfeld, supra note 2, at 1689-94. 
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lize the latter's expectations. Aside from the occasional forays into 
the market, intersubjective dealings also took place intracom-
munally, where they were regulated primarily by common religious 
and ethical norms or by laws conforming to such norms. Given 
that everyone returned to his or her own community except for 
limited market exchanges, it makes sense that the legal norms reg­
ulating market transactions would be procedural in nature. 
Although one cannot properly speak of pluralism in this scenario, 
it would be fair to speak of a proceduralism bound by a plurality of 
distinct communities. 
At the next stage, one can imagine that the market has be­
come more important, and that all the bordering communities 
sending people to the market will associate into a loose confedera­
tion. In this situation, pluralism and proceduralism co-exist, but 
their respective spheres of operation remain completely separated 
from one another. 
As the market encroaches ever more on communal life, how­
ever, proceduralism and pluralism enter a collision course. On the 
one hand, the market increasingly expands onto the terrain for­
merly reserved for communal ethical and religious life, forcing sub­
stantive communal norms to spill over into the sphere of market 
interactions for lack of another suitable outlet. On the other hand, 
since markets are not perfect, the more pervasive market relations 
become, the greater the need to bring in substantive norms in or­
der to channel market transactions toward the common good. 
To the extent that market self-regulation is no longer satisfac­
tory, proceduralism must give way or become subordinated to sub­
stantive norms. Methodological pluralism may be used in an effort 
to prevent proponents of certain conceptions of the good from sub­
jugating proponents of other conceptions, but it is merely a limited 
tool with restricted potential. Comprehensive pluralism, on the 
other hand, provides a full-fledged perspective and therefore de­
serves a closer look. 
The ideal underlying comprehensive pluralism is to create a 
society in which all conceptions of the good are equally encom­
passed, but in which none is dominant (or superior). However, this 
ideal cannot possibly be realized. It is obvious that the entire plii-
ralist project will collapse unless comprehensive pluralism itself is 
given priority over the remaining conceptions of the good. There­
fore, to survive, the project of comprehensive pluralism must split 
and proceed at two distinct levels. Furthermore, this split must 
take place in two logically, though not necessarily temporally, dif-
1996] RIGHTS, DEMOCRACY AND JUSTICE 823 
ferent moments. In the first moment, comprehensive pluralism 
must be detached from other perspectives in order to ascend to the 
requisite position of primacy. Yet to survive, pluralism cannot re­
main detached because it is ultimately parasitic on other perspec­
tives. Indeed, if all other conceptions of the good were to 
disappear, pluralism would become meaningless. Accordingly, a 
second moment must follow. 
In the second moment, pluralism must be reconnected with 
the perspectives from which it had been detached. However, the 
reconnection must allow pluralism to retain its primacy while al­
lowing the other perspectives to remain equal among themselves. 
To be viable, pluralist norms must occupy the place of a second 
order of norms, while the norms which emanate from other sub­
stantive conceptions of the good would operate as first order 
norms. 
If the equal subordination of all first order norms to the sec­
ond order norms of pluralism were possible, then comprehensive 
pluralism could in principle go hand-in-hand with proceduralism. 
However, this is not possible since equal subordination requires 
detachment as well as reintegration. Indeed, detachment of plural­
ism as a second order norm is realized through a process of nega­
tion that is embraced by all comprehensive pluralists and deals 
equally with all first order norms. Hence, in its negative work, 
comprehensive pluralism could rely on purely procedural devices. 
However, with respect to the positive task of reintegrating 
subordinated first order norms, neither equality nor unanimity can 
be achieved by comprehensive pluralism. Because, when it comes 
to reintegrating into a comprehensive pluralist framework, some 
first order norms—such as those of crusading religions—will prove 
altogether incompatible with pluralism and therefore have to be 
suppressed. Other first order norms—such as those of noncrusad-
ing religions—will have to be displaced but they will not have to be 
suppressed. For example, while such norms will be expelled from 
public places, they will be given a protected place in the private 
sphere. 
Even among those first order norms which should be granted 
full reintegration into the comprehensive pluralist polity, some will 
fare better than others. This seems inevitable since the second or­
der norms operating alone cannot determine the configuration of a 
pluralist society's legal and political institutions. Since all fully ad­
mitted first order norms are not likely to coalesce into a harmoni-
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ous whole, institutional norms and practices are bound to rely 
more heavily on some than on others. 
In sum, comprehensive pluralism is a dynamic system that de­
pends on the concurrent work of a thrust and counterthrust which 
is propelled by the permanent tension generated by the friction be­
tween its negative and positive work. In such a setting, procedural-
ism has an important negative role to play—it can be vital in 
plurahsm's struggle against the permanent entrenchment of any 
particular set of first order norms that it encompasses. However, 
proceduralism can also play a limited, but nonetheless crucial, role 
on the positive front. By exposing particular inequities through its 
leveling mechanisms and by revealing concealed inequities through 
the reversal of perspectives (in the case of Habermas's dialogical 
proceduralism), proceduralism can channel pluralism's need for 
contested first order norms toward more encompassing, widely 
shared, and less oppressive alternatives. Although this would not 
solve the problem of reconciling legal and factual equality, it might 
significantly alleviate existing inequities. 
To be sure, this seems to be a far cry from what Habermas 
seems to expect from his proceduralist paradigm of law. All the 
same, while Habermas may not have reconciled democracy, rights, 
and justice through proceduralism, he has certainly shown us crea­
tive and fruitful new ways to approach these elusive subjects, and 
has afforded us new means to sharpen our grasp of them. 
